Newly declassified secret documents from 2003 have revealed the then-defence minister was overruled in a bid to scale down ADF personnel seven months into the Iraq War, including by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet who were concerned about it being a "sensitive time for the US".
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In a new batch of cabinet documents released by the National Archives of Australia relating to the Iraq War, a cabinet submission from Robert Hill seeks a reduction in ADF force elements in Iraq from approximately 840 to 600 or 660, as they would have "largely achieved" the "military end-states" through the ADF operations known as Slipper and Catalyst.
It was noted there was a "continuing poor security situation" in Iraq which was hampering reconstruction efforts, and the then-Senator Hill had offered options for consideration should the government "wish to maintain a presence in Iraq".
In coordination comments, there was widespread support among the departments apart from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which insisted basic goals of the US-led war coalition had not yet been achieved.
"This will be at a time when the allied coalition faces significant challenges in Iraq and the Australian government and coalition objectives which underpin Operation Catalyst (including the restoration of stability and security in Iraq and the search for weapons of mass destruction) have not yet been achieved," the comment states.
"PM&C notes that this is a sensitive time for the US and that the US is currently seeking to involve more countries in Iraq stabilisation efforts and remains heavily engaged in Afghanistan.
"PM&C believes a substantial reduction in Australia's commitment to Iraq prior to the end of 2003 might attract a critical US response detrimental to our broader alliance interests."
The previously secret documents, which were held back for two-and-a-half months from release due to an administration bungle and COVID, have shed further light on the decision-making process surrounding the Australian involvement in the Iraq War.
At the time of the scale-down submission in October 2003, ADF personnel were supporting the post-conflict rehabilitation of Iraq through Operation Catalyst and backing the "war of terror" through Operation Slipper.
Then-Senator Hill noted the "threat environment in Iraq remained high", the US wanted to increase international participation in coalition operations in Iraq, and there was a need for Australia to "pull our weight" on Iraq's rehabilitation.
However, he proposed a strategy to withdraw or reduce certain ADF commitments as well as a review of future deployments. He offered that any ADF force reduction could have been balanced by an increase in training assistance to Iraq's army.
"The military end-states established for Op Catalyst were limited, reflecting the Australian government's policy of not contributing militarily to a major peacekeeping force in Iraq," the minister's submission stated.
PM&C argued any review "should seek an outcome that would see continued credible ADF contributions for both Iraq and the war on terrorism, in the near term, at least".
The minister was overruled.
A cabinet minute dated October 15 noted the submission and stated the strategy for ADF presence in the Middle East was that there be "no significant reduction in the overall number of approximately 880 ADF personnel presently deployed".
The minute notes the defence minister was to "settle the strategy" in consultation with the prime minister, John Howard.
There was also a proposal to deploy an Australian Explosive Ordinance Disposal team to Iraq, but PM&C noted Mr Howard had already knocked it back in July 2003 and it was too much of a casualty risk. It also rejected a bid to increase military training in Afghanistan as the US, UK and New Zealand were already providing such training.
In another cabinet document dated March 24, then-foreign affairs minister Alexander Downer and trade minister Mark Vaile agreed on a strategy for "advancing Australia's commercial and economic interests in Iraq".
"While avoiding any impression of unseemly competition for the 'spoils of war' we should capitalise on commercial opportunities that the reconstruction of Iraq and our role as a key member of the coalition of the willing will inevitably present," the cabinet memo said.
"A paramount objective for us will be the protection of our existing wheat interests in Iraq.
"Despite high-level US political assurances, we will need to work hard to ensure Australian companies are not squeezed out by coalition partners.
"We are systematically bringing Australian firms to the attention of US companies which have secured USAID contracts."